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I INTRODUCTION
A continuing source of concern in man's exploration of space is the
potential for biological contamination of other planets. The possibility
exists that a planet such as Mars is capable of supporting terrestrial
microorganisms, in which case the landing of unsterilized space vehicles
could lead to widespread contamination. One cause for alarm over this
possibility is that it would greatly impede subsequent attempts to detect
indigenous life. In addition, many experts simply feel that contamination
would be morally reprehensible, and it has also been suggested that a
proliferation of earthly microbes might impede future efforts toward
colonization.1 The apparent solution to these concerns is vigorous
sterilization of all spacecraft engaged in planetary exploration. Sterili-
zation can be costly, however, in terms of both direct expense and reduced
spacecraft reliability.
In response to concern over potential contamination of Mars, a plane-
tary quarantine resolution was adopted in 1966. by the Committee on Space
Research (COSPAR) of the International Council of Scientific Unions.
This resolution required that the spacefaring natipns conduct their un-
manned explorations of Mars in such a way that the total probability of
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contamination during a specified quarantine period not exceed 10 . In
its desire to conform with this standard, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) has established a planetary quarantine policy,
administered by a planetary quarantine officer (PQO) whose responsibilities.
are broadly depicted in Figure 1. Given tentative plans as to the number
and character of future missions to Mars, the quarantine officer estab-
lishes a maximum permissible value for the probability of contamination
1
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FIGURE 1 THE HEIRARCHY OF PLANETARY QUARANTINE DECISIONS
from individual missions. These upper bounds, widely known as mission
"allocations are set in such a way as to ensure program conformance
with the COSPAR constraint. The final level of decision-making is then
the determination of engineering specifications that will most efficiently
meet the mission constraint. Some primary means of reducing contamination
probabilities from individual missions are trajectory biasing for fly-bys,
altitude restrictions for orbiters, and spacecraft sterilization for
landers. The central analytical problem of the planetary quarantine pro-
gram is to determine the probability of contamination under a variety of
different mission specifications. This we call the "mission contamina-
tion problem." Its solution is a prerequisite for the determination of
which specifications meet a given mission constraint.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss at a broad conceptual level
the analytical basis for planetary quarantine standards and procedures.
Attention is focused on the final phase of the decision process shown in
Figure 1, and the discussion centers around only the case of landing
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missions. To a large extent, current standards and procedures are based
on the probabilistic model of planetary contamination advanced by Sagan
and Coleman,2 whose work provided both the stimulus and the theoretical
foundation for the COSPAR resolution. We begin in Section II with a
brief account of the Sagan-Coleman model, pointing out the implications
of certain independence assumptions that are critical to their analysis.
It is our contention that these assumptions give an overly simplified
characterization of the problem and that their relaxation might lead to
substantial changes in the final probability assessments. Thus the
issue is not just one of theoretical interest, but one whose potential
implications for policy are considerable. It should be emphasized that
our criticisms concern the structure of the Sagan-Coleman model rather
than the numerical values assigned to various input parameters. On the
matter of parameter values, there have been considerable debate and dis-
cussion,4 but the basic structural assumptions and resulting formulas
are widely accepted by COSPAR, NASA, and NASA contractors as a means of
determining sterilization requirements for Project Viking and other
future unmanned planetary missions.
In Section III we discuss a classical problem in probability theory
that provides, at least in our opinion, a close conceptual parallel to
the type of dependence present in the contamination problem. It is this
dependence that the Sagan-Coleman model fails to account for. In Section
IV we indicate how the shortcomings of the Sagan-Coleman analysis can be
remedied by adopting a slightly richer model structure, explicitly
modeling more of the contingencies that underlie our uncertainty about
contamination.
A general theme underlying our entire presentation is the firm con-
viction that any analytical treatment of planetary quarantine require-
ments must lie squarely in the domain of subjective probability assessment.
3
It is true that much physical evidence exists relevant to the contamina-
tion issue (such as the findings of Mariner 9) and that large amounts of
data (such as the lethality of various sterilization treatments) are
available on various aspects of the problem. It is inevitable, however,
that the quantification of expert scientific judgment will provide the
ultimate means through which all available information is integrated
into an assessment of the total risk of contamination. The model
builder's task is to structure a problem so as to ease the burden of
direct assessment as much as possible without imposing or presuming re-
lationships that may conflict with the expert's judgment. The weaknesses
of the Sagan-Coleman model do not arise from any erroneous characteriza-
tion of physical processes or objects; the question is whether the assump-
tions of the model are consistent with the current state of scientific
information. A separate issue is the degree to which human beings, even
very sophisticated ones, are capable of directly assessing probabilities
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as small as 10 , which the Sagan-Coleman model requires experts to do.
In Section V we indicate how an enriched model structure can help to
overcome this difficulty and also to facilitate communication among ex-
perts. Finally, in Section VI the role of subjective probability assess-
ments in scientific investigation is discussed briefly, with particular
emphasis on the meaning of the COSPAR resolution.
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II THE SAGAN-COLEMAN FORMULA
Let us consider a single mission to Mars. To be specific, we will
suppose that the mission is intended to land a vhicle at some specified
equatorial site on Mars some time in July 1976. Given all mission
specifications, including a proposed sterilization procedure, the mission
contamination problem is to determine the probability of
C = the event that Mars will be biologically contaminated by or-
ganisms aboard this spacecraft
in terms of more fundamental descriptors of the mission. Toward that
end, we further define
N =.the number of viable organisms released to the Martian environ-
ment or into its atmosphere from the spacecraft (a random
variable),
m = k Prob{N=k]
k=l 1
= the expected (or mean) number of viable organisms released,
P = the probability that a single released organism will survive,
multiply, and contaminate a significant fraction of the planet.
The solution advanced by Sagan and Coleman for the mission contamination
problem was the simple approximation
Prob[C] ~ m P , (1)
g
for which no justification was offered. The apparent rationale for this
approximation is as follows. Defining
5
th
E = the event that the i released organism does not survive to
i
multiply and cause contamination,
it is immediate that
l-Prob{C} = Prob{E and... and EN}
1 N
= Prob{N=klProb{El and... and EkIN=k (2)
k=l 1
If, given that k organisms are released, we assume the events E, E2...E k
to be independent and of equal probability, then
Prob{E and.. and Ek N=k} = [Prob{[lIN=kj] k (3)
1 k Lo 1 IJ
Moreover, if we assume that the survival of any one organism is inde-
pendent of the number of organisms released, then
Prob{El IN=kl = Prob{E 1} = 1-P . (4)1 1 g
Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) then gives us
0
1 - Prob[CI =XProb[N=k](l-P )k
EP~~~ g
k=la: 1
co
YE Prob[N=k](l-k P ) = l-m P
g g
k=l 1
*
A set of events EiE2,...,Ek is said to be independent if
Prob{E and...and E.} = Prob{E I...Prob{E.J
1f1 1
for each i = 1,2,.. .k.
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the approximation being justified by the fact that P is very small, and
g
only values of N that are small compared with 1/P have significant
, g
probability. This relationship is equivalent to (1).
Let us now consider the independence assumption underlying (3). If
the assumption is accepted, then the following must hold by definition.
Having learned that exactly k organisms were released and that none of
the first k-l survived, we would not be inclined to alter our initial
assessment for the probability that the last will survive and proliferate.
We do not think this is a reasonable statement, and the reason lies in a
rather fundamental question. Why are we uncertain about the survival of
any single organism? To a large extent, it is because many important
characteristics of the Martian environment are not yet known with cer-
tainty. The events E1 ,..., Ek are mutually dependent on the actual
character of that environment. Learning the fate of the first k-l
organisms tells us something about Mars itself, which in turn tells us
th
something about the k organism's chances of surviving and proliferating.
The extreme case of total dependence is illustrated by the following
scenario. Suppose that the current state of scientific knowledge admits
only two possibilities with respect to the Martian environment: either
it is so hostile that no terrestrial organism could possibly survive,
or else it is to hospitable as to ensure the survival and proliferation
of any such organism. In this case the events EiEE2, ... are totally
dependent, since knowing the fate of any one organism would automatically
-4
tell us the fate of the others. If we assign a probability of 10 to
-4 -4
the hospitable situation and 1-10 to the hostile one, then P = 10
g
Note, however, that
*
Under these conditions, the second and higher order terms in the expan-
sion of (1-P )k are negligible.
g
7
Prob{C} = Prob{N l} X P = Prob{NŽ1} X (10
- 4 ) . (5)
g
In general, the value for Prob{C] given by (5) will be much smaller than
that given by (1). The actual state of current scientific information
would put us somewhere between the case of independence, on which (1) is
based, and the case of total dependence, on which (5) is based.
Turning to the independence assumption underlying (4), our objection
is more subtle. Imagine that, as our spacecraft arrives on Mars, a
scientific expert is sequestered and denied any information other than
unimpeachable evidence that exactly ten viable organisms have been re-
leased. He is then asked to assess the probability that the first
organism released will survive and proliferate. Would this assessment
be any different if he were told that 1000 organisms had been released?
Although we are not certain, there seems to be at least one plausible
reason why he might give different answers in the two circumstances.
Having learned that 1000 organisms were released, the scientist might
think it likely that some engineering failure has led to a hard landing,
releasing many encapsulated organisms. This in turn increases the likeli-
hood that the vehicle has impacted far from its targeted landing site.
A critical uncertainty regarding the life-supporting capability of Mars
concerns the existence of liquid water on the planet, and most scientists
feel that if liquid water exists at all, it is most likely to be in the
polar regions. Consequently, knowing that many organisms have been re-
leased might alter the expert's assessment as to the accessibility of
liquid water and hence the survivability of an individual organism. In
summary, the number of released organisms depends on the mode of landing,
which in turn affects survivability. This argues that the events {N=kl
and E
1
are not independent and hence that (4) is invalid. Another way
of looking at this dependence is to say that Mars is not in fact charac-
terized by a single P value. The probability that a single released
g
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organism will survive and multiply depends on where the organism is re-
leased. Consequently, it is difficult for an expert to make meaningful
probability assessments within the framework of a model that does not
take explicit account of uncertainty about the actual landing site and
impact velocity. This point is pursued further below.
The Sagan-Coleman linear approximation ProbtCl ~ m P is a corner-
g
stone of current quarantine planning procedures. To illustrate its use,
let us suppose that the mission allocation requires Prob[C10
- 4
. Then
the corresponding constraint on the mean number of viable organisms re-
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leased is m<10 /P . The probability P g which is obviously very small,
g
has been directly assessed by scientific experts, internally integrating
the many factors that affect an organism's survivability on Mars. In
contrast, a great deal of laboratory experimentation and additional
modeling has been used in developing assessments for m under various
sterilization procedures.s We have argued that the linear approximation
is based on independence assumptions that are highly suspect. In the
following sections, we discuss the general notion of dependent events in
a more familiar setting and then indicate how the Sagan-Coleman formula-
tion can be modified to eliminate its current weaknesses.
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III A CLASSICAL PARALLEL PROBLEM
The following problem, which has been discussed in a slightly dif-
ferent form by Howardb provides an example of a familiar physical pro-
cess having identical but informationally dependent trials. Its sig-
nificance to the mission contamination problem will be discussed shortly.
Let us suppose that a tack is dropped onto a large flat surface, its
two possible landing positions being labelled "heads" and "tails" as in
the following diagram. You are told only that the tack in the diagram
TAIL HEAD
is drawn to scale, that it will be dropped from a height of four feet
by a human being, and that the surface is very flat. Your first problem
is to assess the probability of a head in one toss, and your second is
to assess the probability of ten heads in ten tosses. To respond that
you don't know the probabilities, having never watched any tack tossing,
is unacceptable. The questions do not concern frequencies or any other
type of "physical fact." We ask only a quantification of your judgment,
recognizing that different people will typically make different assess-
ments. Now suppose that after much scrutiny of the diagram you assess
10
the probability of a head in one toss to be one-half. Is it possible
to deduce from this response, using only the rules of consistency im-
posed by probability theory, your response to the second question? The
answer is no. You simply have not told us enough about your judgment
(or state of information). Before any calculations can be done (on
your behalf), we need to know something about how you feel the individual
tosses relate to one another. To fill in this gap, we might assume that
you view the events,
th
B
i
= the event of a head on the i toss (lfi~10)
as independent, in which case we immediately have
10 -3
Prob{all heads in 10 tosses} = (1/2) -10 
But, considering the characterization of independence given earlier, does
this assumption accurately reflect your state of information? It seems
unlikely, for undoubtedly you would be inclined to alter your initial
assessment for the probability of a head in one toss if we told you the
results of the first nine tosses. Having rejected the independence as-
sumption, how can you compactly express the degree of dependence that you
perceive to exist among the results of the separate trials? Under very
*
mild assumptions, it can be shown that the following characterization
provides all the required information. Let
= the fraction of heads that would be observed in a very long se-
quence of tosses,
which can be viewed only as a random variable with your current state of
information. What we need is your subjective (prior) probability distribu-
tion for the random variable *. This is conveniently expressed by the
cumulative distribution function
*
The assumption is that the trials be exchangeable. For a definition
and discussion of exchangeable trials see de Finetti.'
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F(x) = Prob{[<x] , . Ofx~l
The mean (or expected value) of this distribution is given by
1
E(¢) = [l1-F(x)] dx ,
0
and consistency demands that it equal 0.5. That is, the axioms of proba-
bility theory require that your subjective probability of a head in one
trial equal the mean of your subjective distribution for the fraction of
heads in a great many trials.
Figures 2 through 4 show three possible distribution functions for
the random variable b, each of which is consistent with the earlier as-
sessment that Prob{headl = one-half. The first of these distributions
corresponds to the case of independent trials, the subject being abso-
lutely certain that the long-run fraction of heads will be 50 percent.
Such a distribution might be assessed by an.individual who has spent the
last few months tossing this same tack onto this same surface. Although
he is uncertain as to what will happen in a few trials, he has complete
knowledge of the basic environment, knowing that the tack is equivalent
to an unbiased coin.
The second distribution (Figure 3) corresponds to the case of to-
tally dependent trials. The subject is absolutely certain that the tack
will always either come up heads or come up tails, but he is not sure
which of these cases pertains. (He might have an acquaintance who has
tossed the tack many times, told him it always falls one way, but left
him to guess from there.) He has assessed the probability of all heads
,
Integration by parts shows this formula equivalent to the usual one in
terms of the density function or probability mass function.
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to be one-half and that of all tails to be one-half. Note that if this
subject were able to observe one toss it would resolve all his uncertainty
regarding the outcomes of subsequent tosses.
The type of distribution that we would generally expect, intermediate
to the preceding extreme cases, is shown in Figure 4. Here the subject
reveals great uncertainty as to the experiment's environment, assigning
a uniform distribution over the interval of possible values. The mean
of his distribution, like that of the others, is E(¢) = one-half.
Given the probability distribution for (, we can calculate the proba-
,
bility of all heads in n trials using the formula
n
Probtall heads in n trials} = E(o ), nl .
From this we have computed the relationships shown in Figure 5 for each
distribution discussed earlier. The subject who views the trials as
independent thinks it very unlikely (less than one chance in a thousand)
that we could survive the ten trials without observing a tail. In con-
trast, the subject who views the trials as perfectly dependent continues
to assign a probability of one-half to the event of all heads, regardless
of how many times the tack is tossed. The corresponding relationship for
the third subject lies between these two extremes. In particular, he as-
sesses the probability of ten heads in ten trials to be about 9 percent,
one hundred times the probability assigned by the second distribution.
Thus we find that the three individuals differ greatly in their assess-
ment of what is likely to occur in repeated trials, although they agree
perfectly as to the probability of a head in a single trial. It is the
degree of informational dependence among trials that differs from one
subject to another, and these differences have significant implications.
This is an application of de Finetti's theorem.7hi is cation ti's h em
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Returning to our original concern, consider the following restricted
contamination problem. Suppose that our unmanned mission is a complete
success, landing softly at the targeted equatorial site. We shall denote
this event of successful landing by S. The problem is to assess Prob{CtS,
N=k], the probability of contamination given that the landing is successful
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and k viable organisms are released, as a function of k. The linear
approximation
Prob{CIS, N=k} z k P
g
is represented by the upper curve in Figure 6, using an illustrative P
-4 
value of 10 . To draw a parallel between our thumbtack example and the
problem at hand, let us associate the fate of each individual organism
with a separate toss of the tack, the event of survival and proliferation
being associated with the outcome "tails" and the organism's demise being
associated with "heads." Then l-Prob[CIS, N=kj corresponds to the
probability of all heads in-k trials. The Sagan-Coleman linear approxi-
mation is based on an assumption of independent trials, viewing the in-
dividual organisms as severely biased tacks whose degree of bias is pre-
cisely known. In marked contrast, the extreme scenario of perfect
s~~~~ ~ ~~~~ I I l I I I I lz
Z /INDEPENDENCE
< 101/ (SAGAN-COLEMAN)
D -2( 10 -WW
0
INTERMEDIATE
X 10-3 CASE
° 10 
z
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10- 5
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0 56o~
10
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N = NUMBER OF VIABLE ORGANISMS RELEASED
FIGURE 6 ILLUSTRATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR THE RESTRICTED CONTAMINATION
PROBLEM
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dependence is represented by the lower curve in Figure 6. Here the sub-
ject is certain that either all the organisms will survive or none will,
so Prob[CIS, N=k. is a constant for all k<l. An intermediate case is
represented by the middle curve in Figure 6. This subject, like both the
others, assesses the probability of a single organisms's survival to be
-4
10 . He feels that Prob[CIS, N=kJ increases with k, but not in direct
-2
proportion, approaching an asymptotic value of 10 as k gets very large.
-2
Thus 10 represents the subject's assessed probability that Mars is
contaminable.
The final "solution" to the restricted contamination problem is a
curve like those shown in Figure 6. One could conceivably compute this
relationship by analogy to the thumbtack example, first assessing a
distribution for 3, the fraction of a great many organisms that would die
in a hypothetical experiment, but we feel that better methods are avail-
able. What the thumbtack analogy illustrates is the basic artificiality
of the independence assumption behind (3) and the potential impact of
accounting computationally for informational dependence.
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IV ENRICHING THE MODEL STRUCTURE
Returning to the overall mission contamination problem, let us con-
sider the various levels of detail at which this problem can be modeled.
The first possibility is to do no modeling whatsoever, simply telling the
expert our mission specifications and asking him to assess Prob[Cl di-
rectly. The level of detail proposed by Sagan and Coleman is represented
in Figure 7. Here the basic structure consists of a "biorelease model,"
whose output is the mean number of released organisms, and a "prolifera-
tion model, consisting of a linear relationship between number of re-
leased organisms and contamination probability. It is our feeling that
the Sagan-Coleman model structure must be enriched to at least the extent
shown in Figure 8 if assessment is to be meaningful. An initial "landing
model" has been added through which we explicitly express our uncertainty
about the technical success of the mission. As Figure 9 indicates, the
role of the landing model is to identify a relatively small number of
mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities with respect to landing
Sterilization
Procedure
PROLIFERATION
BIORELEASE m ~ MODEL:
MODEL PROB JCl =nm P
FIGURE 7 BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE SAGAN-COLEMAN MODEL
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FIGURE 8 BASIC LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF A MISSION CONTAMINATION MODEL
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FIGURE 9 ILLUSTRATIVE OUTPUT OF LANDING MODEL (ASSUMING TARGETED
LANDING SITE IS EQUATORIAL)
site and impact velocity, associating a probability assessment with each
such possibility. The other major model components are then a biore-
lease model, yielding a probability distribution for N that is conditional
on the landing outcome, and a proliferation model, yielding a functional
relationship between Prob{C} and N that is also conditional on the landing
outcome. Figure 10 presents an illustrative output of the biorelease
model conditional on a specific landing outcome. A probability is as-
sociated with each of several possible ranges of values that N might as-
sume. A similar illustrative output of the proliferation model, also
conditional on a specific landing outcome, is shown in Figure 11. We
have shown the functional relationship between Prob{Cl and N to be
20
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FIGURE 10 ILLUSTRATIVE OUTPUT OF BIORELEASE MODEL (GIVEN SOFT
EQUATORIAL LANDING)
nonlinear, although the numerical values are purely hypothetical, to
emphasize again that one cannot assume the survival of individual organisms
to be independent events.
The purpose of the landing model in our proposed logical structure
is to provide enough information about technical success of the mission
that the number of released organisms and the survival of any one organism
become independent given this information. It is this requirement that
must dictate the level of detail at which landing outcomes are specified.
When all three major model components have been built, the total proba-
bility of contamination is computed in the obvious way, multiplying and
adding according to the laws of conditional probability. In this regard
one point is worth noting. The Sagan-Coleman analysis implies that the
21
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only information about the distribution of N that we need to know in
computing ProbtCI} is its mean. As the computations in Section II demon-
strate, this results directly from the assumed linear relationship be-
tween ProbtCl and N. If we abandon the Sagan-Coleman independence as-
sumption, recognizing that for any given landing outcome the relationship
may be nonlinear, then the computed value of Prob[C3 will depend in
general on the entire distribution of N rather than just its mean.
The reader will note that the illustrative proliferation model out-
put in Figure 11 serves to solve what we earlier called a restricted
0:>
contamination problem for a specified landing outcome. In Section III
it was argued that the thumbtack problem contains a similar type of101 1 2
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FIGURE 11 ILLUSTRATIVE OUTPUT OF PROLIFERATION MODEL (GIVEN SOFT
EQUATORIAL LANDING)
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it was argued that the thumbtack problem contains a similar type of
22
1
uncertainty, but we do not feel that a similar method of solution is in-
dicated for the two problems. If someone were to ask exactly why you
view successive tosses of a thumbtack as dependent trials, it would
probably be hard to answer in physical terms. The uncertainty that we
feel about the outcomes of individual trials is difficult to express
directly in terms of the uncertainty surrounding such physical properties
as the hardness of the surface, the weight of the tack head, and so
forth. Rather it is the extremely complicated interaction of many con-
siderations, most of them not consciously identified, that leads to un-
certainty. For most people, the best way to think about the problem is
through the long-run frequency 0 identified earlier. Equivalently
stated, it is difficult (or unnatural, or unprofitable) to model the
problem at a level of detail richer than a single probability distribu-
tion for .
In contrast, most experts find it quite easy to identify specific
physical considerations that contribute to their uncertainty about an
organism's survival on Mars. Some of the most important such considera-
tions are schematically represented in Figure 12. The central line in
this figure portrays basic events required for growth and proliferation
of a released organism, while the upper and lower lines portray charac-
teristics of the Martian environment that influence the likelihood of
those events. Of critical importance is the matter of liquid water.
There are no known terrestrial organisms that can proliferate in the
absence of water, and it is thought that the atmospheric pressure every-
where on Mars is below the triple-point pressure for water. Thus an
organism must find its way to a nonequilibrium microenvironment, such as
a salt pool or a pressure pocket under a polar cap, where water exists
at least periodically. Important environmental factors are then the
existence, general location, extent, and accessibility of such hospitable
microenvironments. Also important are the degree of protection from
23
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ultraviolet radiation afforded by the Martian atmosphere and dust, which
bears on the organism's survival in transit, and the character of Martian
wind patterns. Even if we were given a relatively complete description
of all these environmental factors, a good deal of uncertainty would re-
main concerning the organism's fate, and the events on the central line
of Figure 12 are intended to reflect that remaining uncertainty.
It is conceivable that each of the functional relationships between
Prob[Cl and N that constitute the "proliferation model" shown in Figure 7
could be directly encoded from expert judgment. This would require that
the expert integrate internally all the diverse considerations shown in
Figure 12. At the other extreme, one could build an exhaustive proba-
bilistic model of the Martian environment and then encode the relation-
ship conditional on both the landing outcome and the values assumed by
all environmental factors. It is conceivable that we could condition on
so many environmental factors as to make the survival of individual
organisms independent given this information, in which case an expert
would have to assess only the conditional probability of a single or-
ganism's survival and proliferation for each combination of environ-
mental factors and landing outcome. Between these two extremes of direct
encoding and exhaustive modeling of the Martian environment are interme-
diate levels of detail similar to those shown in Figure 13. Here we ex-
plicitly represent uncertainty about a few of the environmental factors
that make the survival of individual organisms mutually dependent. The
relationship between Prob[CJ and N is then directly encoded for each
combination of values for the factors modeled, always conditional on a
specific landing outcome. The underlying model structure shown in
Figure 13 is very crude, and it is all but impossible to say what repre-
sents an "appropriate" level of detail within the broad range of potential
models. Typically, one should begin with a very crude structure and
continue refining it so long as experts feel that the additional detail
is helpful in focusing their judgment.
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V THE VALUE OF MODELING FOR ENCODING AND COMMUNICATION
We have indicated that a richer model structure would be valuable
for the problem of assessing Prob{Cl in terms of N (given a specified
landing site). There are two basic reasons for this recommendation.
First is that more detailed modeling will help the expert in assessing
a single organism's chances for survival and proliferation. That is, he
can build up a personal assessment for P by first making separate as-
g
sessments on various critical environmental factors and then assessing
P conditional on these factors. This accomplishes a reduction in com-
g
plexity, replacing one large, complicated question with a series of
smaller ones that are more easily conceptualized. We have also argued
that a richer model structure will assist the expert in assessing the
parametric dependence of Prob[CJ on N by explicitly accounting for at
least some of the factors that make the survival of separate organisms
informationally dependent events.
Two other advantages to additional modeling relate closely to the
reduction of complexity. The first concerns the well-documented diffi-
culty of directly assessing very small probabilities. If a person tells
-4
you that he assesses the probability of event E to be 10 and that of
-6 1
event E 2 to be 10 , then you can be quite sure that he considers both
events unlikely, with E
1
more likely than E2 . Experience indicates, how-
ever, that we should take care in attaching any absolute significance to
the numerical assessments. Would he, for example, rather bet on E
2
oc-
curring or on being dealt a royal flush in a game of 5-card stud poker?
Since calculation will show that the latter event has a probability of
-6
about 1.5 X 10 , the person's assessment would lead us to conclude that
he prefers to bet on the royal flush. Yet one can hardly be confident
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that such a preference would emerge if the question were asked directly.
The problem is that, when asked to assess probabilities smaller than
(say) 1/100, we all have difficulty conjuring up familiar reference
events that we perceive to be of comparable likelihood. In many applica-
-2 -3
tions, a probability of 10 or 10 can in fact be used as a working
definition of impossibility. One might argue that scientists are unusu-
-3
ally comfortable working with numbers as small as 10 , but we are not
convinced that they are accustomed to explicitly dealing with subjective
probabilities of this magnitude. One aid that the analyst can provide
is a set of familiar reference events, such as the royal flush example
if the expert happens to be a poker player, against which relative like-
lihood can be compared. Greater assistance is usually provided by en-
riching the model structure, recognizing that most rare events can be de-
composed into a sequence of requisite component events. By modeling that
sequence, encoding the conditional probability of each given the occurrence
of its predecessors, we enable the expert to assess only probabilities of
a readily comprehensible magnitude.
Up to now we have addressed only the problem of how a single scientific
expert can be aided in developing a quantitative assessment of planetary
contamination risks that is logically consistent with his information and
judgment. There is no particular reason to think that two different ex-
perts will arrive at the same assessments. In developing a planetary
quarantine policy, however, NASA is clearly concerned with the matter of
consensus. One would hope that disagreement among experts (as has hap-
pened in the assessment of P ) is traceable to differences in the informa-
g
tion available to them and hence resolvable by exchanging information.
Such intercourse can be greatly facilitated if assessments are built up
from a model structure fine enough to demonstrate which specific aspects
of the problem (such as existence of liquid water in the equatorial re-
gion) are judged differently. Finally, it is apparent that the relative
28
expertise of most scientists is not uniform over all considerations rele-
vant to Martian contamination. This has already been implicitly recog-
nized in the use made of the Sagan-Coleman model. The community of ex-
perts asked to assess the value of m under various different sterilization
procedures is almost totally separate from the community considered most
expert in assessing P . It seems quite likely that modeling more of the
g
uncertain Martian characteristics that underlie the functional relation
between Prob[C} and N would allow further differentiation of expertise.
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VI RELATED ISSUES
We have argued that the subjective interpretation is the only meaning-
ful interpretation of the word probability, at least in the context of the
planetary contamination problem. Our criticism of the Sagan-Coleman model
can be summarized as follows. If equation (1) is viewed as the definition
of Prob{Cl, then this quantity does not represent a probability in any
sense that we understand the term, because the assumptions of independence
are not consistent with the current state of scientific information. A
natural question at this point concerns the spirit of the COSPAR resolu-
tion. Rather than actually being concerned with the probability of
Martian contamination, its authors might simply have intended to require
that Prob{C], as defined by (1), not exceed a specified bound. If this
is the case, then current standards and the analytical basis on which
they rest are appropriate, assuming that we wish to comply in all good
faith with the spirit of the resolution. We would contend, however,
that in this event, Prob£C] must be viewed as just one of many possible
numerical indices related to the threat of contamination, having no
particular significance beyond its being institutionalized through an
international agreement.
The great advantage of using probability as the quantitative measure
of uncertainty lies in the role that probability assessments play within
the broader conceptual framework of decision analysis.8 The central idea
of this analytical discipline for the treatment of decisions under uncer-
tainty is to separate the issues of value and likelihood. On the one
hand we assess (appropriately conditional) probabilities for the uncertain
events that impinge on our decision, and on the other we associate value
30
assessments with each of the outcomes ultimately possible as a consequence
of the actions taken. The probabilities and value assessments can then
be integrated in a systematic and rational way. An application of this
procedure to space project planning is given by Matheson and Roths,9 and
the same conceptual framework underlies the discussion of Levinthal,
Lederberg, and Sagan. If uncertainty is measured in any way other than
through probability assessments, then we no longer know how to integrate
such measures with value assessments to reveal the preferred course of
action. It is our belief that the language of subjective probability, as
part of the broader conceptual framework of decision analysis, can be of
great value in solving the resource allocation problems that arise at
all levels of scientific investigation.
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